Find all Dominant Strategy Solutions, IESDS Solutions, and Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

18) Chns and Forrest plan to meet for lunch and Forrest’s phone is (yet again) dead. Alas, they much decide where to go without communicating with one another. If they both end up at the same restaurant, they each get 10 utils. If Chris goes to Blaze pizza rind Forrest goes to Jimmy Johns, they both get 6 utils. if Chris goes to Jimmy lohns and Forrest goes to Blaze pizza, Chris gets 6 utils and Forrest gets 12 utils (Chris always bothers Forrest about his pizza preferences).

a) Draw the game matrix that represents the scenario described above.

b) Find all Dominant Strategy Solutions, IESDS Solutions, and Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (i.e., you should have three answers here).

c) Scenario 2: Now, assume that Chris considers going to Chipotle as well, but Forrest does not. If Chris goes to Chipotle and Forrest goes to Blaze, they both get 7 utils. If Chris goes to Chipotle and Forrest goes to Jimmy Johns, Chris gets 8 utils and Forrest gets 10. Draw the new game matrix, assuming all prior payoffs are the same.

d) Find all Dominant Strategy Solutions, IESDS Solutions, and Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Scenario 2 (again, you should have three answers here).