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7- Ford Motor Company is the defendant in several product liability suits pending in the circuit court of Greene County. In each case, Ford raised a defense of improper venue and moved to transfer the case to a county where venue was proper. Venue in Missouri is determined by statute, which requires that actions be filed where the cause of action occurred or where the corporation has an office or agent conducting regular business. The cause of action was not in Greene County, and Ford does not have an office in Greene County. However, Ford Motor Credit Company, Ford’s wholly-owned subsidiary, does maintain an office in Greene County. Ford Credit has its own offices and directors. It also has its own articles of incorporation and is organized under the laws of Delaware. Its principal place of business is Dearborn, Michigan. Ford Credit is in the business of purchasing retail contracts and leases of automobiles entered into by the dealer and its retail and commercial customers. Ford Credit also participates in commercial lending, including providing automobile wholesale inventory financing and capital, revolving credit, and mortgage loans to Ford and non-Ford dealers. A consumer is not required to finance a Ford Motor Company vehicle through Ford Credit. A consumer may choose to finance a vehicle through a bank or another credit service that may offer similar products and services. The manufacturer is not a party at any time to the retail installment contract or to lease agreements. Interest and principal payments from consumers and dealers are received by Ford Credit and not held in trust for Ford Motor Company. Ford Motor Company and Ford Credit are not parties to any agreement restricting or conditioning Ford Credit’s ability to finance a customer’s purchase of a vehicle or a dealer’s inventory purchases.[State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Bacon, 63 S.W.3d 641 (2002).]
Q1 Is Ford Credit an agent of Ford Motor Company? Why?
9- In 2000, Loretta Henry was pregnant and experiencing pain in her abdomen. After visiting a clinic, she was referred to Flagstaff Medical Hospital. Once there, she was examined and treated by Dr. Kraig Knoll, a physician with a physician’s group providing a service for the hospital. Knoll advised her to have her gallbladder removed, and he performed the surgery. Although Henry read and signed two consent forms, she was never told that Knoll was not an employee of the hospital and was instead an independent contractor. Subsequently, Henry sued the hospital for negligence when after her child was born, both mother and child sustained injuries. She claimed there was an apparent agency relationship. The hospital argued that Henry could not establish an agency relationship between Flagstaff Hospital and Knoll.n [Loretta Henry/Charles Arnold v. Flagstaff Medical, 212 Ariz. 365; 132 P.3d 304; 2006 Ariz. App. LEXIS 53; 476 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 11.
Q1 What duties did Flagstaff Hospital owe Knoll as an independent contractor?
Q2 Did the court find enough evidence to establish an agency relationship?
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8-Doug Hartmann Productions, L.L.C., and the Regal Riverfront Hotel, which was owned by Gateway Hotel Holdings, entered into an agreement for a professional boxing match to be held at the hotel. The contract contained a provision stating that a $5 million indemnity insurance policy was to be provided and Hartmann Productions was to provide a doctor at ringside for the match and an ambulance on stand-by at the hotel the night of the event. Maldonado was a professional boxer who participated in the match. The fight ended when Maldonado was knocked out and later lost consciousness in his dressing room. There was no ambulance on site. An ambulance was called, and Maldonado was taken to a hospital. He suffered severe brain damage as a result of his injury. The damage could have been less severe had an ambulance been on-site for the boxing match.Maldonado sued Gateway, asserting that Hartmann Productions was an independent contractor hired by Gateway to perform an inherently dangerous activity. As such, Gateway had a duty to take special precautions to prevent injury during the inherently dangerous activity. Therefore, Maldonado argued that Gateway should be held liable for the damages resulting from the boxing match. [Maldonado v. Gateway Holdings, L.L.C., 154 S.W.3d 303 (2003).]
Q1 Should the boxing match be considered an inherently dangerous activity?
Q2 Did the court find Gateway liable?
9-In 1989, William Petrovich’s employer, the Chicago Federation of Musicians, provided health care coverage to all of its employees by enrolling them all in Share Health Plan of Illinois. Share is an HMO and pays only for medical care that is obtained within its network of physicians. To qualify for benefits, a Share member must select a primary care physician, who will provide that member’s overall care and authorize referrals when neces-sary. Share gives its members a list of participating physicians from which to choose. Inga Petrovich, William’s wife, selected Dr. Marie Kowalski from Share’s list and began seeing Kowalski as her primary care physician.In September 1990, Mrs. Petrovich saw Kowalski because she was experiencing persistent pain in her mouth, tongue, throat, and face. She also complained of a foul mucus in her mouth. Kowalski referred her to Dr. Friedman, an ear, nose, and throat specialist who had a contract with Share. When Friedman ordered that an MRI be done, Kowalski refused and instead sent a copy of an old MRI. In June 1991, after Mrs. Petrovich had made multiple visits to both doctors, Friedman found cancerous growths in Mrs. Petrovich’s mouth. He performed surgery to remove the cancer later that month.Petrovich subsequently sued Share for medical malpractice. The complaint alleges that both Kowalski and Friedman were negligent in failing to diagnose Inga Petrovich’s cancer in a timely manner and that Share is vicariously liable for their negligence. Share filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it cannot be held liable for the negligence of Kowalski or Friedman because they were acting as independent contractors, not as Share’s agents. [Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999).]
Q1 How should the court decide? What reasons should it give?
